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Surgery or Butchery? Engquist v. Oregon, Class-ofOne Equal Protection, and the Shift to Categorical
Treatment of Public Employees' Constitutional
Claims
"Even if some surgery were truly necessary to prevent
governments from being forced to defend a multitude of equal
protection 'class of one' claims, the Court should use a scalpel
rather than a meat-axe."'
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I. PRELUDE: THE CASE OF EVA CIECHON

A career paramedic employed by the City of Chicago, Ms.
Ciechon was called to her shift fourteen hours early during the
record-setting Chicago Blizzard of 1979.2 While on her twentyseventh call during her twenty-seventh hour of work, Ms. Ciechon3
and a fellow paramedic were treating an elderly man at his home.
The man was short of breath after chipping ice and shoveling
snow. 4 He refused to be taken to the hospital but demanded that
oxygen be administered to him.5 Through her initial questioning of
the patient, Ms. Ciechon determined that he had a prior condition,
a collapsed lung, which made the administration of oxygen outside
of a controlled medical environment a dangerous, perhaps lifethreatening, proposition. After unsuccessfully pleading with the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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patient to accept hospital treatment, Ms. Ciechon and her colleague
left the scene.7 Soon thereafter the patient died.8 His family,
understandably distraught, had the city conduct an investigation
into the incident. 9 Ms. Ciechon boasted a spotless record and three
years of expenence.10 Yet, it was she, and she alone, who was
terminated from employment." Although not a member of anr
class traditionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Ms. Ciechon was vindicated by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals on equal protection grounds. 13 The court expressed
disbelief "that a three-year career paramedic with a theretofore
unblemished record would be discharged for a single incident of
alleged improper conduct."' 14 It concluded:
In this case the family's grief was expressed in pointless
vengeance and, in view of media and family pressure, the
official investigation was single-mindedly and intentionally
directed to ruining the career of one, but only one, of the...
employees involved in this unfortunate incident. Because of
these two factors, we have no5 difficulty in finding [a
violation] of... equal protection.'
As an employee of the city of Chicago, Ms. Ciechon enjoyed
the protection of the Constitution from the adverse employment
action taken against her.' 6 Today, however, the same right that she
relied upon is no longer available to public employees subjected to
similar mistreatment.
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Engquist v. Oregon Department ofAgriculture substantially altered
the law of the Equal Protection Clause in the public employment
context. 17 Post-Engquist,plaintiffs like Ms. Ciechon are denied the
right to assert equal protection claims when they cannot allege
7. Id.
8. Id.at 515.
9. Id.
10. Id.at 516.
11. Id. at515.
12. See 16B AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 802 (1998) ("While the
principal target of the Equal Protection Clause is discrimination against members
of vulnerable groups, the clause also protects 'class-of-one' plaintiffs victimized
by wholly arbitrary acts." (citing Ind. State Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs
of the City of Indianapolis, 101 F.3d 1179 (7th Cir. 1996))).
13. Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 516-17 (7th Cir. 1982).
14. Id.at 516.
15. Id.at 516-17.
16. See 16A AM. JuR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 392 (1998).
17. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Application of Class-of-One Theory
ofEqual Protectionto Public Employment, 32 A.L.R. 6TH 457 (2008).
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class-based discrimination. 8 Even if public employees are treated
differently from their coworkers for arbitrary and malicious
reasons, the Equal Protection
Clause is unavailable to them under
9
the class-of-one theory.'
II. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

A state's citizens wield a wider constitutional shield than its
employees. The United States Supreme Court has long held that
"[tihe government as employer indeed has far broader powers than
does the government as sovereign.' 20 On this basis, the Court has
concluded that "government has significantly greater leeway in its
dealings with citizen employees than it does
21 when it brings its
sovereign power to bear on citizens at large."
Although these principles are well established, the Court
recently employed the constitutional wiggle-room it affords
government employers to effect a significant change in public
employment law. First, in the 2006 case of Garcetti v. Ceballos,
the Court held that "when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties . . . the Constitution does not
22
insulate their communications from employer discipline."
Essentially, the First Amendment no longer shields speech in the
public employment context conducted as part of an employee's
job. This per se rule is a significant departure from the Court's
prior First Amendment jurisprudence. In prior cases, a balancing
approach was employed to determine whether a public employee
should be afforded First Amendment protection. 23 In the 2008 case
18. Engquistv. Or. Dep'tofAgric., 128 S. Ct. 2146,2157(2008).
19. Id.
20. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) "The government's interest
in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it
acts as employer." Id. at 675.
21. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at2151.
22. 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
23. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968). This approach balances the interest of the employee in his or her
right to freedom of expression under the First Amendment against the
countervailing interest of the employer in the orderly operation of the workplace.
Garcetti adds a threshold question before the Connick-Pickeringbalancing test can
be reached in public employment speech cases-was the employee acting in his or
her official capacity when the expression in question took place? Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 421. Even after Garcetti, the balancing test is still employed in determining
whether a public employee's First Amendment rights were violated by an adverse
employment action done in response to speech exercised outside of that
employee's official capacity. Id.
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of Engquist v. Oregon, the Court again categorically denied public
employees the right to assert a constitutional claim, holding the
class-of-one theory of equal protection inapplicable in the public
employment context.24 On its face, this shift in the treatment of
public employees' constitutional claims is indicative of the current
25
Court's legal philosophy with respect to these types of cases.
However, the movement from a balancing approach to a
categorical approach also signals the Court's desire to effect a
change in judicial process for public employees' constitutional
claims in general. This development has altered the distinctive
nature of public employment, making it more similar to its private
sector counterpart.
The rationales set forth in Engquist and Garcettireflect that the
shift to categorical treatment of public employees' constitutional
claims was motivated by two major concerns. In Garcetti, the
Court feared the "displacement of managerial discretion with
judicial supervision.' 26 n Engquist, the Court echoed this concern
in support of a related, but not identical, apprehension. 27 It was
feared that the entanglement of the federal judiciary in
discretionary employment matters would lead to a flood of
litigation.28 Both of these rationales deserve skepticism and
scrutiny.
The Court's new per se approach to public employees'
constitutional claims has been criticized in the First Amendment
context as a harmful departure from prior law that could "fail to
29
advance-and may even harm-the important interests at stake.,
Concern regarding the displacement of managerial discretion with
judicial supervision seems a "slender reed"3° upon which to base
such a significant change in the law. With respect to class-of-one
equal protection claims, the unsubstantiated fear of a potential
24. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2148-49 ("We hold that such a 'class-of-one'
theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment context.").
25. Ramona L. Paetzold, Supreme Court's 2005-2006 Term Employment
Law Cases:Do New Justices Imply New Directions?, 10 EMp. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 303, 348-49 (2006). The author explains that the addition of Justices Roberts
and Alito has shifted the balance of the Court in employment law cases toward the
conservative end of the spectrum. She examines this change in the Court's

composition in light of Garcetti and posits that it may result in a "significant
conservative shift in legal ideology, if not outcomes." Id. at 348.
26. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2157 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423).
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term: Leading Cases,I. ConstitutionalLaw, F.
Freedom of Speech and Expression, 2. Public Employee Speech, 120 HARV. L.
REv. 273 (2006).
30. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,434 (1920).
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flood of constitutional litigation in the public employment context
also appears to be a flimsy justification for the categorical denial of
such claims. One commentator has advanced the view that:
Concerns about floodgates are not unreasonable from a
practical point of view, but they are an unprincipled reason
for completely excising some instances of unequal treatment
from the [Equal Protection Clause's] purview . . . . [T]he
need remains for some principle to distinguish between
judicially-cognizable claims and 3ovemment action that
does not implicate equal protection.
It is ironic that a constitutional right has been denied to public
employees based on the potential that too many of them might
invoke its protection.
In his dissent in Engquist, Justice Stevens criticized the
majority's rule as being "based upon speculation about inapt
hypothetical cases. '32 Indeed, the Court offered no concrete
support for its assertion that the class-of-one theory's application
in the public employment context would cause a flood of litigation.
The denial of these claims in this area is too harsh because it
eliminates what could be the only viable remedy for a certain set of
plaintiffs. Further, the Court's dual rationale for that denial is
flawed. First, the Court erred by applying principles to the public
employment context that are more closely related to private
employment. Second, the Court failed to substantiate its flood
concern with actual cases. The implications of the shift to
categorical treatment of public employees' constitutional claims
not only include the alteration of the judicial process with respect
to these cases, but also encompass the erosion of the distinguishing
traits of public employment through the misplaced application of
private employment law principles.
This Comment will address the concerns expressed by the
Court in Engquist and will suggest an approach that would limit,
but not deny, the availability of class-of-one equal protection
claims to public employees. Part III will present an overview of the
relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence, including an introduction to
the class-of-one theory and an analysis of the link between the
Court's rationales in Garcettiand Engquist. It will also address the
second justification offered by the Court in Engquist for its
holding. By relating all of these rationales, Part III will ultimately
posit that these two cases have changed the legal rights afforded to
31. William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal
Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493, 501-02 (2007).
32. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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public employees in such a way as to make public employment
more similar to private employment. Part IV will examine a
sample of federal class-of-one equal protection claims, both in
district courts and circuit [courts of appeals.] The analysis of these
cases will determine whether the Court's concerns regarding
unnecessary judicial involvement in public employment disputes
and the resulting flood of litigation are justified. Finally, Part V
will suggest an alternative to the categorical treatment of public
employees' class-of-one claims. This approach limits class-of-one
cases and allows potentially valid claims to proceed on the merits.
III. THE

SHIFT TO CATEGORICAL TREATMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL

CLAIMS IN THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: BACKGROUND,
EFFECT, AND IMPLICATIONS

A. Class-of-One Equal Protectionand Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech
Grace and Thaddeus Olech resided in the peaceful village of
Willowbrook,33 a small town just west of Chicago.34 They
requested that the municipality connect their home to the local
water supply. 35 This required the Olechs and any other residents
who desired municipal water service to grant the village an
easement on their property. 36 Although it had only required fifteenfoot easements from the other residents, the village demanded a
thirty-three-foot easement on the Olech's property without any
justification. 37 The Olechs sued the village, alleging violation of
their rights under the Equal Protection Clause.38 They claimed that
the village's "demand was irrational and wholly arbitrary" and
"that [it] was actually motivated by ill will resulting from their
previous filing of an unrelated successful lawsuit against the
village."39 In a short per curiam opinion, the United States
Supreme Court explained that its "cases have recognized
successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,'
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated

33. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563 (2000) (per curiam).
34. Google Maps, http://maps.google.com (last visited July 5, 2009) (search
"Village of Willowbrook, Illinois").
35. Olech, 528 U.S. at 563.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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differently from others similarly situated ' and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment. AO
The Court cited two of its landmark cases in support of the
class-of-one theory. 41 This indicates that, to the unanimous Justices
so holding, the formal recognition of the class-of-one theory was
not a change in the law. The Court merely issued a reminder of
what had always been a valid cause of action under the Equal
Protection Clause. "Indeed, one might argue that instead of calling
them 'classes of one,' the.. . Court could have avoided confusion
by simply stating that individual 'persons,' and not just classes42
have always been protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Court was clear in its position that the Equal
Protection Clause has always protected "classes of one, ' 43 it was
feared that courts would go from seeing no class-of-one claims to
processing hundreds of them. 44 Immediately after Olech one
commentator suggested:
If anyone can sue the government for an equal protection
violation merely by alleging that she was treated differently
than others with no rational basis for the different
treatment, then governmental law offices should be hiring
new attorneys to defend against an avalanche of lawsuits
from disappointed citizens ....
A member of the Olech Court had the foresight to address this
concern. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer suggested adoption of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' rationale.46 That court
required class-of-one plaintiffs to allege "an extra factor . . . a
40. Id. at 564.
41. Id. (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923);
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336
(1989)).
42. David S. Cheval, Note, By the Way---The Equal Protection Clause has
Always Protecteda "Class-of-One": An Examination of Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 593, 610 (2002).
43. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. The Court's position is not surprising considering
its well-settled principle that "the Equal Protection Clause 'protect[s] persons, not
groups."' Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701,
743 (2007) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Metro Broad., Inc. v.
F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289 (1978); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown fl), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
44. Shaun M. Gehan, Comment, With Malice Toward One: Malice and the
Substantive Law in "Class of One" Equal Protection Claims in the Wake of
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 54 ME. L. REv. 329, 332 (2002).
45. Paul D. Wilson, What Hath Olech Wrought? The EqualProtectionClause
in Recent Land-Use Damages Litigation, 33 URB. LAW. 729, 731-32 (2001).
46. Olech, 528 U.S. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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factor that the Court of Appeals called 'vindictive action,'
'illegitimate animus,' or 'ill will. ' ' A7 He explained that this
additional requirement would be "sufficient to minimize any
concern about transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases
of constitutional right.As
Despite Justice Breyer's expressed concern and suggested
remedy, the Court was unmoved by the potential flood of litigation
at that time. It expressly did "not reach the alternative theory of
'subjective ill will' relied on by [the Seventh Circuit]. ' 49 The
Court's failure to affirm this portion of the Seventh Circuit's
opinion has been interpreted as a failure to overrule it. 5° As a
result, the application of this subjective factor to class-of-one
claims is discretionary.51 Indeed, after Olech many federal courts
have applied such an element in class-of-one cases." Still, the
Supreme Court was unfazed by the fear that a flood of litigation
would result from Olech's formal recognition of class-of-one equal
protection. After the passage of time, changes in the Court's
composition, and presentation of the same concern in a new
53
context, the Court's position on this issue changed dramatically.
B. The Related Rationalesof Engquist v. Oregon and Garcetti v.
Ceballos: AddressingEmployers and Courts 'Fear of the
Constitutionalizationof Workplace Disputes
Eight years after Olech, the Supreme Court was faced with a
class-of-one equal protection claim in the public employment
context. In Engquist v. Oregon, the flood concern raised by Justice
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 565 (majority opinion).
50. Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 78 WASH. L. REv. 367, 400 (2003).
51. Id.
52. Nicole Richter, A Standardfor "Class of One" Claims Under the Equal
Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendment: Protecting Victims of Non-Class
Based Discriminationfrom Vindictive State Action, 35 VAL. U. L. REv. 197, 22831 (2000) (noting that even after the Supreme Court's failure to address the
subjective element relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in Olech, the First, Second,
and Seventh Circuits continued to apply a subjective illegitimate animus factor, in
various articulations, to class-of-one equal protection claims).
53. See Paetzold, supra note 25 (discussing the appointments of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito to the United States Supreme Court and their impact on
the Court's conservative leanings). Compare Olech, 528 U.S. at 562 (Court
permitted class-of-one claim in the municipal zoning context), with Engquist v.
Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008) (Court denied a class-of-one claim in
the public employment context).
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Breyer in Village of Willowbrook was recognized. 54 On top of its
recognition, the Court supported the categorical denial of public
employees' class-of-one claims with this once-ignored issue. 55
Although this appeared to be a dramatic development, it was not
the first time the Court abrogated a previously valid constitutional
claim in the area of public employment.
In Garcetti, the Court denied First Amendment protection to
public employees while acting in their official capacities. 56 This
denial was based upon the concern that permitting these claims
would unnecessarily involve federal courts in employment disputes
concerning discretionary decisions.5 7 In Engquist, the Court used
this rationale to bolster its hypothesis that allowing class-of-one
claims in the public employment context would cause a flood of
litigation. 58 Although separate, these justifications are linked.
Displacing managerial discretion with judicial supervision
inevitably results in the federal judiciary's involvement
in these
59
types of employment matters through civil suits.
In Engquist, the Court predicted that this possibility would
result in a flood of class-of-one cases. 60 The fear of the
displacement of managerial discretion was substantial enough for
the Court to impose a partial denial of First Amendment
protections to government employees in Garcetti.6 1 However, in
Engquist, the Court employed this reasoning along with the flood
rationale to support the complete denial of class-of-one equal
62
protection rights to that same group of citizens.
In Olech, the flood concern went unmentioned. Yet in
Engquist, it was deemed so worrisome in the public employment
context as to require the categorical denial of class-of-one equal
protection claims to government employees. This shift in the
treatment of public employees' constitutional claims not only
changes the judicial process with respect to these types of cases,
but also alters public employment through the influence of private
employment law.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2157.
Id.
547 U.S. 410,423 (2006).
Id.
Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at2157.

59. See id.
60. Id.

61. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 423.
62. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at2157.
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1. Engquist v. Oregon and the CategoricalDenialof Class-ofOne EqualProtection to PublicEmployees
Anup Engquist was employed by the Oregon Department of
Agriculture as an international food standards specialist.6 3 She
challenged being passed over for a promotion and her eventual
termination under a class-of-one equal protection theory, "alleging
that she was fired not because she was a member of an identified
class (unlike her race, sex, and national origin claims), but simply
for 'arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons.'" ' 64 In a six-tothree opinion, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority,
the Court held the class-of-one theory inapplicable in the public
employment context. 65 The creation of this per se rule was
supported by the concern that allowing public employees to assert
66
this type of claim would result in a flood of meritless law suits.
The Court explained:
The practical problem with allowing class-of-one claims to
go forward in this context is not that it will be too easy for
plaintiffs to prevail, but that governments will be forced to
defend a multitude of such claims in the first place, and
courts will be obliged to sort through them in a search for
the proverbial needle in a haystack. The Equal Protection
Clause does not require "[t]his displacement of managerial
discretion by judicial supervision."
Although not an unreasonable concern, this assertion was left
unsubstantiated. Eight years after Olech there was class-of-one
jurisprudence that the Engquist Court could have referenced in
support of its contention. This deficiency was not lost on the
dissenting members of the Court.
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justices Ginsberg and
Souter, criticized the majority's approach as a sort of butchery,
stating, "[p]resumably the concern that actually motivates today's
decision is fear that governments will be forced to defend against a
multitude of 'class of one' claims unless the Court wields its meataxe forthwith. 68 It is disconcerting that the guardian of the
63. Id. at2149.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2157.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citations omitted). The portion of this excerpt in quotations is the
concern advanced by the Court in Garcetti to support the denial of First
Amendment claims in the public employment context. This represents the link
between the Court's rationale in that case to the one set forth in Engquist.
68. Id. at 2160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Constitution would take such a broad stroke with its judicial blade
so as to completely cut off a constitutional claim from the body of
rights afforded to a certain group of citizens. The Court failed to
even consider an alternative approach that might prevent a flood of
frivolous litigation and still preserve meritorious claims. Unlike the
majority, Justice Stevens at least attempted to support his view
with actual evidence:
Experience demonstrates, however, that these claims are
brought infrequently, that the vast majority of such claims
are asserted in complaints advancing other claims as well,
and that all but a handful are dismissed well in advance of
trial. Experience also demonstrates that there are in fact
rare cases in which
a petty tyrant has misused
69
governmental power.
Though Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's
categorical rule, he failed to advance an alternative that would
address the flood concern and still preserve viable class-of-one
claims. Indeed, no member of the Court addressed the subjective
"ill will" prong advocated by Justice Breyer in Olech. The
dissenting Justices could have strengthened their position and
weakened the asserted necessity for the majority's categorical rule
if they had at least acknowledged the availability of an alternative.
2. Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Link to the Rationale of Engquist
Richard Ceballos, an assistant district attorney, was reassigned,
transferred, and denied a promotion after drafting a memorandum
that identified serious misrepresentations in an affidavit used to
obtain a search warrant. 70 He claimed that the adverse employment
actions taken against him were retaliation for his exposure of the
flawed affidavit 71 and sought redress in federal court, alleging
violation of his First Amendment rights.72 The Court replaced the
balancing test that it traditionally used in public employment
speech cases with a per se rule when public employees assert First
Amendment claims based upon job-related expression. The Court
held that public employees acting in their official capacity no
longer enjoy the protection of the First Amendment. 74 In doing so,
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414-15 (2006).
Id. at415.
Id.
Id. at421.
Id. at 426.
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the Court created a threshold inquiry into the public employees'
status at the time of expression before the traditional balancing
analysis could be reached.75 This shift to categorical treatment of
these types of constitutional claims was supported in part by the
rationale that was later set forth in Engquist for the same treatment
of class-of-one claims in the public employment context. The
Court in Garcetti opined:
Ceballos' proposed contrary rule, adopted by the Court of
Appeals, would commit state and federal courts to a new,
permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight
of communications between and among government
employees and their superiors in the course of official
business. This displacement of managerial discretion by
judicial supervision finds no support in our precedents.76
Even though this was the sole justification in Garcetti, the
Court in Engquist used this concern as support for the possibility
that permitting class-of-one claims in the public employment
context would lead to a flood of these types of claims. Admittedly,
these rationales are not identical. However, they are closely
related. The displacement of managerial discretion by judicial
supervision would not be a significant concern if not for the
possibility that such judicial involvement in discretionary
employment matters would occur too often. It seems
counterintuitive that the Court would disclaim its responsibility as
guardian of public employees' constitutional rights because it does
not want to second-guess government employers' decisions. The
protection of those rights may require judicial scrutiny. It is even
more disturbing that a similar denial could be based on fears that
too many individuals might seek vindication of a particular
constitutional right.
Rights exist for their protection to be claimed. If individuals do
so, it is the responsibility of the courts to accept those claims and
determine their merits. A citizen's right to seek legal redress of
injuries and grievances has been an inextricable part of
constitutional law for more than two centuries. In Marbury v.
Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall recognized that:

75. Id. at 421. See also Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's
Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L.
REv. 63, 82 (2008) ("[The initial threshold inquiry rests primarily on whether the
employee was speaking in his capacity as a citizen, rather than on whether the
speech related to a matter of public concern.").
76. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 423.
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The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection .... The government
of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.7 7
The application of Engquist and Garcetti's categorical rules
eliminates what may be the only remedies available when
particular rights are violated. Undoubtedly, Chief Justice John
Marshall would view this as being in direct conflict with the "very
essence of civil liberty."78 Such a significant departure from
Supreme Court precedent must have been motivated by something
more than fears of unnecessary judicial supervision of government
employers and a flood of constitutional claims by government
employees. The retrenchment of constitutional protections in the
public employment context diminishes one of the traditional
distinctions between private and public employment-the ability
of public employees to challenge adverse employment actions
through constitutional claims.
Private employment law's
influence on the Court's holding in Engquist is even more apparent
upon examination of the second justification offered for the
categorical denial of class-of-one claims to public employees.
C. Class-of-One Equal Protection,Employment-at- Will, and Other
FactorsMotivating the CategoricalTreatment of Public
Employees' ConstitutionalClaims
In Engquist, the Court advanced a second concern separate
from the fear of a flood of class-of-one litigation. The Court also
predicted that permitting the assertion of class-of-one claims in the
public employment context would destroy the practice of at-will
employment. ' Chief Justice Roberts explained:
State employers cannot, of course, take personnel actions
that would independently violate the Constitution. But
recognition of a class-of-one theory of equal protection in
the public employment context-that is, a claim that the
77. 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
78. See id.
79. See 43 AM. JUR. Trials 1 § 1 (2008) (database).
80. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2156(2008).
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State treated an employee differently from others for a bad
reason, or for no reason at all-is simply contrary to the
concept of at-will employment. The Constitution
does not
8
require repudiating that familiar doctrine. 1
This bold assertion did not go unnoticed by Justice Stevens in his
dissent. He found that "[the majority's] conclusion [was] based
upon . . . an incorrect evaluation of the importance of the
government's interest in preserving a regime of 'at will'
employment."82 The Court's concern regarding the impact that the
class-of-one theory might have on public employment is
misplaced. By its application of a private employment concept to
public employment, the Court has made the latter institution more
like its private sector counterpart.
1. Dissenting Critiques: CircuitJudge Reinhardt and Justice
Stevens
In its opinion in Engquist, the Supreme Court asserted that
permitting class-of-one claims in the public employment context
would be "contrary to" the concept of at-will employment and
would result in the repudiation of "that familiar doctrine." 83 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed the same misgivings. 84 It
reasoned that "[a]pplying equal protection to forbid arbitrary or
malicious firings of public employees would completely invalidate
the practice of public at-will employment.18 5 In his dissent, Circuit
Judge Reinhardt concluded that the Ninth Circuit imposed its
categorical denial "because it [was] needlessly concerned that the
class-of-one rule would eliminate at-will employment."' 86 He
explained that "there [was] no cause for the majority's concern"
because "[t]he application of class-of-one equal protection
principles is hardly fatal to at-will employment., 87 Judge Reinhardt
concluded that "[i]t is certainly not necessary, in order to preserve
the concept of at-will employment, to hold that government
may
88
freely treat its employees maliciously and irrationally.,

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2156 (majority opinion).
Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 995.
Id. at 1012.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Stevens reached the same conclusion with respect to the
majority opinion's elimination-of-employment-at-will argument.
He lent support to Judge Reinhardt's position by drawing "a clear
distinction between an exercise of discretion and an arbitrary
decision." 89 Justice Stevens explained that "the Equal Protection
Clause proscribes arbitrary decisions--decisions unsupported by
any rational basis-not unwise ones." 90 Thus, "a discretionary
decision with any 'reasonably conceivable' rational justification
will not support an equal protection claim; only a truly arbitrary
one will."" For Justice Stevens, this logic rendered the public
employment 92exception for class-of-one equal protection claims
unnecessary.
Justice Stevens also dismissed the majority's contention
because today public employment and the at-will doctrine are
incompatible. He explained that "[i]n the 1890's [the employmentat-will] doctrine applied broadly to government employment, but
for many years now the theory that public employment which may
be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless
of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected., 93 He continued
by pointing out that "recent constitutional decisions and statutory
enactments have all but nullified the significance of the
doctrine." 94 He concluded that "preserving the remnants of 'atwill' employment provides a feeble justification for creating a
broad exception to a well-established category of constitutional
protections. 95
Public employment is not entirely comparable to at-will
employment. Many government employees are not employed at
will. For example, a state university professor might enjoy tenure
status, which prevents that public employer from terminating the
professor except in a very limited set of circumstances. 96 Also, at a
very basic level, the Constitution proscribes adverse employment
actions taken against public employees that violate their
constitutional rights. In the private sector, an adverse employment
action cannot be challenged under the Constitution no matter what

89. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2159 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id,
91. Id.
92. See id. at 2161.
93. Id. at 2160 (citations omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id,
96. See 14A C.J.S. Colleges and Universities § 20 (2006).
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constitutional provision it might violate. 97 Thus, the Court's
assertion that permitting class-of-one equal protection claims in the
public employment context would result in the repudiation of the
doctrine of at-will employment is simply false. Employment-atwill is more prevalent and applicable to private sector jobs than
public sector jobs. 98 Perhaps it is the Court's unstated fear that
public employment law will influence private employment so as to
result in negative effects upon the doctrine of at-will employment
in the private sector, but Engquist actually achieved the opposite
result. The Court has significantly altered public employment
through the application of private employment law principles,
resulting in diminished constitutional protection of government
employees.
2. The Relationship of PrivateEmployment and Public
Employment: ReciprocalInfluences
Professor Samuel Issacharoff, a constitutional law scholar at
New York University School of Law, has recognized the influence
of public emtployment law on private employment rights
jurisprudence.99 He noted "the dramatic expansion of public-sector
employment and the critical role that public-sector litigation has
played in the development of common law."' 100 To Issacharoff, "it
is not surprising that courts seeking to redress wrongful-dischare
claims routinely look to the public sector cases for guidance.'"I
He characterized public employment as a "natural arena for the
pioneering of substantive claims to employment rights," observing
that "[s]ince the 1960s, the public sector has been the source of
97. MARK A ROTHSTEIN, CHARLEs B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SCHROEDER &
ELAINE W. SHOBEN, EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.9, at 467 (3d ed. 2005).

98. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[F]or many years
now 'the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly
rejected."' (citations omitted)). See also Bijal J. Patel, Myspace or Yours: The
Abridgment of the Blogosphere at the Hands ofAt- Will Employment, 44 HOus. L.
REV. 777, 795 (2007) ("Employment at-will is a widely accepted doctrine
governing private employment in the United States."); Tom Ivester, Employment
Law: Classification in Oklahoma Public Employment: Does it Really Matter?, 53

OKLA. L. REV. 143, 145 (2000) ("In the early 1950s, however, the Supreme Court
began to apply due process protections to public employment and move away
from employment-at-will.").
99. Samual Issacharoff, ReconstructingEmployment, 104 HARv. L. REV. 607,
616-617 (1990) (reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE
(1990)).
100. Id at 616.
101. Id.at 617.
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dramatic expansions in
10 2 employee rights to free expression, due
process, and privacy."'
The recent developments in the Supreme Court's public
employment jurisprudence, however, indicate an opposite trend to
that identified by Professor Issacharoff. The Court's concern in
Engquist with respect to at-will employment and its fear in
Engquist and Garcetti with regard to the displacement of
managerial discretion both signal the significant influence of
private employment law upon these decisions. Engquist made
public employment more like private employment through its
denial of a constitutional protection to public employees and its
misplaced concern regarding the repudiation of at-will
employment. 10 3 Garcetti also had this effect. Private sector
employees have never enjoyed the degree of protection that public
employees have with respect to speech and expression.' 0 4 Through
its retrenchment of public employees' First Amendment rights,
Garcetti placed public employees in a similar position to private
employees. When acting in their official capacity, public and
private employees are now both estopped from challenging adverse
employment actions as violations of their First Amendment rights.
The Court's creation of two categorical rules with respect to
public employees' First Amendment and class-of-one equal
protection rights alters the government workplace to more closely
resemble the private workplace. These changes are manifestations
of the Court's current conservative ideology with respect 10to5
constitutional claims in the public employment context.
Government employers are the beneficiaries of public employees'
diminished constitutional rights. The Court has elevated the
interest of the government employer in the orderly operation of the
workplace above the interest of the government employee in the
protection of the Constitution. Not only is this development
supported by the recent pronouncements of the Court, but also by
recent changes in the Court's composition.
When Olech was decided, the Court's composition was slightly
different than it is today. Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate
102. Id. at 616.
103. See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156.
104. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 80 (2003) (citing Barr v. KelsoBurnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354 (Ill. 1985) (holding that"[a]n employer publisher
was a private entity, not a governmental entity, and thus was legally incapable of
violating anyone's First Amendment rights.")).
105. See Paetzold, supra note 25. Professor Paetzold asserts that the Garcetti
opinion is emblematic of the Supreme Court's current conservative stance. Id. at
349. It is this author's opinion that the Engquist opinion is also an indication of the
Court's conservative leanings.
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Justice Samuel Alito took their seats on September 29, 2005 and
January 31, 2006, respectively. 10 6 Both were appointed in time to
take part in the Court's opinion in Garcetti.10 7 After evaluating the
Court's decision in Garcetti, Dr. Ramona L. Paetzold, Professor
and Mays Research Fellow of the Mays Business School at Texas
A&M University, concluded that the "sweeping, per se rule"
enunciated therein "renders public employment much more similar
to private employment, making public service marginally less
attractive than it previously was."" 8 The tongue-in-cheek jab that
followed Professor Paetzold's observation of Garcetti's
significance raises another important point. 109 Presumably, one of
the benefits of public employment is the added protection that
public employees are afforded by the Constitution. However, the
Court's shift to categorical treatment of certain constitutional
claims in the public employment context has the effect of eroding
one of the characteristics that differentiates public employment
from private employment. Although Professor Paetzold reserved
judgment as to what direction the Court will ultimately take on
public employment matters, this Comment has the benefit of the
further development that she awaited-the Court's opinion in
Engquist.l l0 The retrenchment of constitutional protections
afforded to public employees represents a substantial shift in the
legal philosophy of the Court. Two new, conservative-leaning
Justices have influenced the Court to fashion rules in the public
employment context that render it more like private employment.
Since its formal recognition, the Court has limited the class-ofone equal protection theory by denying its application to public
employment. The concerns expressed by Justice Breyer, although
not heeded by the Court in Olech, were heard loud and clear by the
Court in Engquist. With the arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, a concern that before was only a minority view has
become the foundation upon which a categorical denial of a
constitutional claim is based. This development is also indicative
of the influence of private employment law upon the Court's
posture toward public employment.
106. THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT (2008), http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf.
107. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (argued Mar. 21, 2006 and
decided May 30, 2006).
108. Paetzold, supra note 25, at 346.
109. Id. Professor Paetzold sarcastically observes that if public employment
were not already unattractive enough, the diminishment of constitutional
protection afforded to public employees, arguably one of the benefits of public
employment, makes it even less attractive.
110. Id.at348-49.
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IV. EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL CLASS-OF-ONE CASES
A. IntroductoryComments: Purposeand Limitation
The Supreme Court's flood rationale in Engquist can be
critically assessed through an examination of federal class-of-one
cases. Ultimately, the analysis of these cases will validate the
assertion of Justice Stevens's dissent "that ['class of one'] claims
are brought infrequently, that the vast majority of such claims are
asserted in complaints advancing other claims as well and that all
but a handful are dismissed well in advance of trial."'1 1 Although
Justice Stevens lamented the majority opinion's reliance on "inapt,
hypothetical cases" for its holding,'2 this critique of the Court's
categorical rule has the benefit of several years of class-of-one
litigation.11 3 The disposition of each of these cases provides a basis
upon which the necessity of that rule can be judged.
The analysis begins with 2001 federal jurisprudence, the year
after Olech's formal recognition of the class-of-one theory, and
extends to present cases. This examination is confined to cases in
which the public employees' claims are expressly stated as classof-one. However, class-of-one claims have been asserted in the
114
public employment context without being labeled class-of-one.
It must be conceded that this sample does not include all class-ofone claims asserted by public employees during the period
analyzed. Still, the search that produced the sample was designed
to retrieve all cases that involved claims by public employees
specifically identified as class-of-one. The volume of cases in the
sample is at least representative of the number of claims formally
111. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2160-61 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id.at2159.
113. Class-of-one equal protection claims of public employees were identified
using a Westlaw terms-and-connectors search in the "ALLFEDS" database,
performed as follows: class-of-one and "equal protection" /p"public employee" or
"public employees." The search returned 139 results, 108 of which involved
formally stated class-of-one claims and 105 of which are relevant to this study.
This search was originally performed in the fall of 2009. Since, the amount of

results that the search returns has increased.
114.

E.g., Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1982).

Although this case was decided well before Olech's formal recognition of the
class-of-one theory, the Seventh Circuit upheld the public employee's class-of-one
type claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Judge Posner has called Ciechon
"the extreme case that kicked off the 'class of one' movement." Lauth v.
McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005). Based on this characterization, it
can be assumed that plaintiffs followed Ciechon's framework and did not label
their claims as class-of-one.
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stated as class-of-one claims. Also, the fact that this sampling is
not comprehensive does not diminish the significance of the
proportion of the cases that involve multiple federal claims and
that are dismissed on preliminary motions.
B. Analysis: Circuit Court ofAppeals and United States District
Court Opinions
1. Cases Examined by Year
The sample contained three class-of-one claims asserted in
2001, two at the appellate level and one at the district court level.
In both court of appeals cases, the plaintiffs asserted other federal
law claims along with the class-of-one claim. 115 In each case, the
appellate courts affirmed summary judgment as to all federal law
claims. 16 In the district court case, the public employee asserted
117
three other federal law claims along with his class-of-one claim.
The court granted the employee's motion for8 a preliminary
injunction on equal protection and other grounds."i
For 2002, nine class-of-one claims were returned in the sample.
Three were circuit court of appeals cases, and six were district
court cases. At the app'ellate level, all three cases involved multiple
constitutional claims.
In two of the three cases, the courts of
115. Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740 (2d Cir. 2001) (Former
officer challenged discharge under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and state and city law. Court
of appeals affirmed district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city
as to officer's ADA, due process, and equal protection claims. Court of appeals
remanded state and city lay claims to state court.); Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Sch., 263
F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (Employee asserted due process and class-of-one equal
protection claims, as well as pendent state law claims. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer
as to all claims.).
116. Giordano,274 F.3d 740; Bartell, 263 F.3d 1143.
117. Caudell v. City of Toccoa, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (City
commissioner challenged state legislative act under a class-of-one equal protection
theory, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the First Amendment, the Bill of Attainder
Clause, and the Home-Rule provisions of Georgia law. District court held that the
act violated plaintiff's rights under the Equal Protection Clause.).
118. Id. at 1378.
119. Conlon v. Austin, 48 F. App'x 816 (2d Cir. 2002) (Fire department
lieutenant challenged transfer on First Amendment and class-of-one equal
protection grounds. Court of appeals affirmed district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of employer as to both claims.); Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery
Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2002) (Employee challenged termination on
procedural due process, substantive due process, and class-of-one equal protection
grounds. Court of appeals affirmed district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of employer as to all claims.); Bower v. Vill. of Mount Sterling, 44 F. App'x
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appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer on
all claims. 120 In the other case, the court of appeals reversed
summary judgment in favor of the employer on the class-of-one
claim. 12 At the district court level, five of the six cases involved
multiple federal claims.' 22 Of those five cases, two were
completely dismissed on summary judgment. 123 In one of those
five cases, the employee's class-of-one claim was the only federal
claim dismissed on summary judgment.' 24 In two of the five
district court cases that involved multiple federal claims, the classof-one claims survived motions for summary judgment. 25 One of
claim that
the six district court cases involved only a class-of-one
26
also survived a motion for summary judgment. 1
For 2003, six class-of-one claims were returned in the sample,
two at the appellate level and four at the district court level. In the
circuit courts of appeals, both cases involved multiple

670 (6th Cir. 2002) (Individual challenged hiring decision, asserting due process
and class-of-one equal protection claims. Court of appeals affirmed district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of village as to due process claim but
reversed as to the class-of-one claim.).
120. Conlon, 48 F. App'x 816; Wojcik, 300 F.3d 92.
121. Bower, 44 F. App'x 670.
122. Kozlowski v. Fry, 238 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. I11.2002) (Employee
brought Title VII and class-of-one equal protection claims. Although district court
found that summary judgment was precluded on Title VII claims, employee's
class-of-one claim was dismissed.); Campagna v. Comm. of Mass. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 206 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Mass. 2002) (Employee challenged adverse
employment action on First Amendment and equal protection grounds. District
court dismissed both claims.); McWaters v. Rick, 195 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Va.
2002) (Member of county board of supervisors filed suit alleging violation of
rights under First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause. District court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss finding that board member stated valid class-of-one
equal protection and First Amendment retaliation claims.); Vickowski v.
Hukowicz, 201 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2002) (Former police officer alleged
violations of First Amendment and equal protection rights. District court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant as to both claims.); Russo v. City of
Hartford, 184 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Conn. 2002) (Police officer challenged
suspension on First Amendment, equal protection, and procedural and substantive
due process grounds. Although district court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss as to plaintiff's First Amendment and procedural due process claims, court
denied the motion with regard to plaintiff's equal protection and substantive due
process claims.).
123. Campgana,206 F. Supp. 2d 120; Vickowski, 201 F. Supp. 2d 195.
124. Kozlowski, 238 F. Supp. 2d 996.
125. Mc Waters, 195 F. Supp. 2d 781; Russo, 184 F. Supp. 2d 169.
126. Carr v. Vill. of Willow Springs, No. 01 C 7807, 2002 WL 1559665 (N.D.
Ill. July 16, 2002) (Former police officer brought equal protection claim. District
court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Officer's claim was upheld under a
class-of-one theory.).
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constitutional claims. 127 In each case, all of the claims were
dismissed on motions for summary judgment. 12 8 In the district
129
courts, three of the four cases involved multiple federal claims.
In all three the employees' claims were dismissed on summary
judgment. The one district court case that involved only a classof-one claim
survived the defendant's motion for summary
13 1
judgment.

The sample contained six class-of-one claims asserted in 2004,
two in the circuit courts of appeals and four in the district courts.
At the appellate level, both cases involved multiple federal
claims. 132 In one of those cases, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's dismissal of all the employee's claims. 133 In the
other case, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's denial of

127. Doubet v. Eckelberg, 81. F. App'x 596 (7th Cir. 2003) (Police officer
challenged demotions and termination on due process, First Amendment, and
class-of-one equal protection grounds. Court of appeals affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment on all claims in favor of the employer.);
Campagna v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 334 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2003) (Employee
challenged disciplinary employment actions under the First Amendment and a
class-of-one equal protection theory. Court of appeals affirmed district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of employer as to both claims.).
128. Doubet, 81 F. App'x 596; Campagna,334 F.3d 150.
129. Padilla v. Harris, 285 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Conn. 2003) (Employee
challenged termination, asserting Title VII and class-of-one equal protection
claims. District court ruled in favor of defendant on motion for summary judgment
as to both claims.); McLaughlin v. Chi. Transit Auth., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (N.D.
I11. 2003) (Employee asserted Title VII, class-of-one equal protection, and Family
and Medical Leave Act claims. District court found in favor of the employer on
motion for summary judgment on all claims.); Lyon v. Jones, 260 F. Supp. 2d 507
(D. Conn. 2003) (Employee alleged discrimination under Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause. District court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment as to all claims.).
130. Padilla,285 F. Supp. 2d 263; McLaughlin, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1130; Lyon,
260 F. Supp. 2d 507.
131. Yates ex rel. Estate of Yates v. Beck, No. I:03CV1O-T, 2003 WL
22231260 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2003) (District court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss plaintiffs class-of-one equal protection claim.).
132. Carpenter v. City of Torrington, 100 F. App'x 858 (2d Cir. 2004)
(Employee brought Title VII, due process, and class-of-one equal protection
claims. Court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims.);
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004) (Employee challenged disciplinary
action, asserting First Amendment and both selective prosecution and class-of-one
equal protection claims. Court of appeals reversed judgment in favor of employees
on First Amendment and selective prosecution equal protection. However, court of
appeals affirmed the denial of employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law
on the class-of-one equal protection claim but remanded that claim for a new trial
due to an erroneous jury instruction.).
133. Carpenter,100 F. App'x 858.
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34
the employer's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law.'
Thus, in that case, the class-of-one claim had already proceeded
through trial. In the district courts, three of the four cases involved
multiple federal claims. 135 In all three of those cases the class-ofone claims were dismissed on summary judgment.
In the one
case that only asserted a class-of-one37claim, the defendant's motion
for summary judgment was denied. 1
For 2005, fifteen class-of-one claims were returned in the
sample, three in the circuit courts of appeals and twelve in the
district courts. While this was an increase in claims compared to
the years previously analyzed, the plaintiffs' success rate for this
set of cases decreased significantly. At the appellate level, all three
cases involved only class-of-one claims. 13 Two of those cases
were dismissed on preliminary motions.' 39 In the other case, the
court of appeals reversed the district court's post-trial grant of
judgment as a matter of law for the employee. 140 Thus, in that case,

134. Cobb, 363 F.3d 89.
135. Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D.N.M. 2004)
(Employee asserted Title VII discrimination and class-of-one equal protection
claims. District court found that, in the Tenth Circuit, class-of-one equal protection
claims applied in the public employment context. However, court found that
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the class-of-one claim.);
Levesque v. Town of Vernon, 341 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Conn. 2004) (Employee
asserted procedural and substantive due process, First Amendment, and equal
protection claims as well as pendent state law claims. District court found that
town officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from due process claims and
dismissed First Amendment and equal protection claims.); Patrolmen's Benev.
Ass'n of City of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, No. 02 Civ. 3976(BSJ)(FM),
2004 WL 3262798 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2004) (Employee asserted claims under the
Due Process Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause under a class-of-one theory, as well as pendent local and state
law claims. All constitutional claims were dismissed.).
136. Kelley, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1183; Levesque, 341 F. Supp. 2d 126;
Patrolmen'sBenev. Ass'n of City ofN. Y, 2004 WL 3262798.
137. Montanye v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 327 F. Supp. 2d 510 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(Employee alleged violation of equal protection and state constitution. Even
though teacher did not assert class-of-one claim explicitly, court permitted claim
under that theory. The claim was upheld.).
138. Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2005) (Police officer
challenged suspension under a class-of-one theory. Court of appeals affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the claim.); Neilson v. D'Angelis, 409 F.3d 100 (2d
Cir. 2005) (Officer challenged disciplinary action on class-of-one grounds. Court
of appeals reversed district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
officer.); Bizarro v. Miranda, 394 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (Employees challenged
institution of disciplinary charges under a class-of-one equal protection theory.
Court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of a motion for summary
judgment for employer on qualified immunity grounds.).
139. Lauth, 424 F.3d 631; Bizarro,394 F.3d 82.
140. Nielson, 409 F.3d 100.
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the class-of-one claim had already proceeded through trial. At the
district court level, eleven of the twelve cases involved multiple
federal claims. 141 In all eleven cases the class-of-one claims were
dismissed on preliminary motions. f42 In the case in which the
plaintiff only asserted a class-of-one claimf the district court
dismissed the case on summary judgment.1 3 Thus, out of the
fifteen total claims, only one proceeded to trial.
141. Benjamin v. Schuller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (Employee
brought due process and equal protection claims. District court granted employer's
motion for summary judgment as to all claims.); Rivera v. City of New York, 392
F. Supp. 2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Employee asserted substantive and procedural
due process and class-of-one equal protection claims, along with state law claims.
District court granted employers motion for summary judgment on all claims.);
Perry v. Metro. Suburban Bus Auth., 390 F. Supp. 2d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(Employee challenged termination, asserting due process, class-of-one equal
protection, and conspiracy claims, along with state law claims. District court
granted employer's motion to dismiss as to all claims.); Hicks v. Jackson County
Comm'n, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (Employee asserted procedural
due process and class-of-one equal protection claims. District court ruled in favor
of employer on its motion for summary judgment as to all claims.); Williams v.
LaCrosse, No. Civ.A. 03-6724, 2005 WL 927112 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2005)
(Former police trooper brought First Amendment, substantive and procedural due
process, and class-of-one equal protection claims. District court granted
employer's motion as to all claims.); Inturri v. City of Hartford, Conn., 365 F.
Supp. 2d 240 (D. Conn. 2005) (Employees asserted due process and class-of-one
equal protection claims. District court granted employer's motion for summary
judgment on all claims.); Hinton v. Conner, 366 F. Supp. 2d 297 (M.D.N.C. 2005)
(Employee asserted First Amendment, procedural and substantive due process,
and class-of-one equal protection claims, as well as state law claims. District court
granted employer's motion for summary judgment as to employee's due process
and equal protection claims but not as to employee's First Amendment claim.);
Tuskowski v. Griffin, 359 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D. Conn. 2005) (Employee asserted
First Amendment and class-of-one equal protection claims. District court granted
employer's motion for summary judgment as to both claims.); Brantley v. City of
New Haven, 364 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2005) (Employee asserted First
Amendment and class-of-one equal protection claims. District court granted
employer's motion to dismiss both claims.); Levine v. McCabe, 357 F. Supp. 2d
608 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Employee asserted due process, class-of-one equal
protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clause claims. District court granted
employer's motion to dismiss all claims.); Harvey v. Mark, 352 F. Supp. 2d 285
(D. Conn. 2005) (Employee asserted Title VII and both class-based and class-ofone equal protection claims. District court granted employer's motion for
summary judgment as to both claims.).
142. Benjamin, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1055; Rivera, 392 F. Supp. 2d 644; Perry, 390
F. Supp. 2d 251; Hicks, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1084; Williams, 2005 WL 927112;
Inturri, 365 F. Supp. 2d 240; Hinton, 366 F. Supp. 2d 297; Tuskowski, 359 F.
Supp. 2d 225; Brantley, 364 F. Supp. 2d 198; Levine, 357 F. Supp. 2d 608;
Harvey, 352 F. Supp. 2d 285.
143. Young v. Mahoning County, Ohio, 418 F. Supp. 2d 948 (N.D. Ohio 2005)
(Employee asserted state municipal liability and class-of-one equal protection
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The sample contained fourteen total class-of-one claims
asserted by public employees in 2006, five at the appellate level
and nine at the lower level. In the circuit courts of appeals, four of
the five cases involved multiple federal claims. 44 In all four of
these cases summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the
defendants on the class-of-one claims. 145 In the case that involved
only a class-of-one claim, the appellate court also affirmed the
lower court's dismissal on summary judgment. 146 In the district
courts, eight of the nine cases asserting class-of-one claims
involved other federal claims. 147 In five of those eight cases, the

claims. District court ruled in favor of employer on its motion for summary
judgment as to both claims.).
144. Eggleston v. Bieluch, 203 F. App'x 257 (11th Cir. 2006) (Employee
asserted class-of-one equal protection, First Amendment, and procedural due
process claims. Court of appeals affirmed grant of summary judgment in favor of
employer on the class-of-one and First Amendment claims.); Matsey v.
Westmoreland County, 185 F. App'x 126 (3d Cir. 2006) (Employee challenged
termination, asserting First Amendment, class-of-one equal protection, due
process, and state law claims. Court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment as to all claims.); Nance v. New Orleans & Baton Rouge
Steamship Pilots' Ass'n, 174 F. App'x 849 (5th Cir. 2006) (Employee challenged
suspension on procedural due process and class-of-one equal protection grounds.
Court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of employer's motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds as to both claims.); Golden v.
Town of Collierville, 167 F. App'x 474 (6th Cir. 2006) (Employee challenged
denial of promotion on procedural due process and class-of-one equal protection
grounds. Court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of employer as to both claims.).
145. Eggleston, 203 F. App'x 257; Matsey, 185 F. App'x 126; Nance, 174 F.
App'x 849; Golden, 167 F. App'x 474.
146. Sellars v. City of Gary, 453 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2006) (Employee brought
class-of-one equal protection and breach of contract claims against employer.
Court of appeals affirmed grant of summary judgment on both claims in favor of
the employer.).
147. Axt v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 1:06-CV-157-TS, 2006 WL 3093235
(N.D. Ind. Oct. 30, 2006) (Employee asserted due process and class-of-one equal
protection claims. District court granted employer's motion to dismiss as to
employee's equal protection claim but denied the motion as to employee's due
process claim.); Barry v. Luzeme County, 447 F. Supp. 2d 238 (M.D. Pa. 2006)
(Employee alleged violations of First Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Equal
Protection Clause under a class-of-one theory. District court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to due process and class-of-one equal protection
claims. As to First Amendment claims, employee was permitted to proceed against
all defendants except one.); Bailey v. Town of Evans, N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 427
(W.D.N.Y. 2006) (Employee asserted First Amendment and class-of-one equal
protection claims. District court denied employer's motion to dismiss as to both
claims.); McGee v. Green, 425 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2006) (Employee
asserted First Amendment and class-of-one equal protection claims, as well as
state law claims. District court granted employer's motion for summary judgment
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class-of-one claims were dismissed on preliminary motions. 4 8 In
three of the eight cases involving multiple federal claims, the classof-one claims survived motions to dismiss. 149 The one district court
case that involved only a class-of-one claim was dismissed on
summary judgment. 150 Although the success rate of plaintiffs in
2006 slightly increased compared to previous years, it did so only
marginally.
For 2007, sixteen cases involving class-of-one claims were
returned in the sample, two at the appellate level and fourteen at
the lower court level. In the circuit courts of appeals, both cases
involved multiple federal claims, and both courts affirmed the
dismissal of the class-of-one claims by the lower courts.' 5 ' In the
district courts, thirteen of the fourteen cases involved multiple
federal claims. 152 Of those thirteen cases, nine were dismissed on

as to all claims.); Lee v. Conn., 427 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D. Conn. 2006) (Employee
brought Title VII discrimination and both class-based and class-of-one equal
protection claims. District court granted employer's motion for summary
judgment as to all claims.); Smedberg v. Conn. Dept. of Transp., 425 F. Supp. 2d
262 (D. Conn. 2006) (Employee asserted First Amendment and class-of-one equal
protection claims. District court granted employer's motion for summary
judgment as to both claims.); Huff v. City of Portland, No. Civ. 05-1831-AA,
2006 WL 572152 (D. Or. Mar. 6, 2006) (Employee asserted wrongful discharge,
First Amendment retaliation, and class-of-one equal protection claims. District
court denied employer's motion to dismiss wrongful discharge and class-of-one
claims.); Baynton v. Wyatt, 411 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (D. Or. 2006) (Employee
asserted First Amendment retaliation, class-of-one equal protection, and
substantive due process claims, as well as state law claims. District court granted
employer's motion to dismiss as to employee's wrongful discharge claim but
denied the motion as to the class-of-one equal protection and due process claims.).
148. Axt, 2006 WL 3093235; Barry, 447 F. Supp. 2d 238; McGee, 425 F.
Supp. 2d 249; Lee, 427 F. Supp. 2d 124; Smedberg, 425 F. Supp. 2d 262.
149. Bailey, 443 F. Supp. 2d 427; Huff, 2006 WL 572152; Baynton, 411 F.
Supp. 2d 1223.
150. Engelbrecht v. Clackamas County, No. CV05-665-PK, 2006 WL
2927244 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2006) (Employee asserted class-of-one equal protection
and state law claims. District court granted employer's motion for summary
judgment on all claims.).
151. Mosca v. Cole, 217 F. App'x 158 (3d Cir. 2007) (Employee challenged
termination, asserting Title VII, class-of-one equal protection, procedural due
process, and First Amendment claims. Court of appeals affirmed district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of employer as to all federal claims.);
Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (Employee filed suit
asserting Title VII, 28 U.S.C. 1981, class-of-one equal protection, and substantive
and procedural due process claims, as well as state claims. Court of appeals
reversed district court's ruling in favor of employee on the equal protection claim,
finding the class-of-one theory inapplicable in public employment context.).
152. Albert v. City of Hartford, 529 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. Conn. 2007) (Police
officer asserted "class of one," race-based, and hostile work environment equal
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protection claims, First Amendment claim, and deprivation of constitutional rights.
District court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all equal
protection claims and the deprivation claim. District court denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment claim.); Milardo v. City of
Middletown, 528 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D. Conn. 2007) (Employee asserted First
Amendment retaliation and class-of-one equal protection claims. District court
granted employer's motion for summary judgment as to both claims.); Meer v.
Graham, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Employee challenged termination,
asserting procedural and substantive due process, First Amendment, and class-ofone equal protection claims, as well as state law claims. District court denied
defendants' motion to dismiss as to all constitutional claims.); Maglietti v.
Nicholson, 517 F. Supp. 2d 624 (D. Conn. 2007) (Employee asserted Title VII,
Rehabilitation Act (RA), First Amendment, procedural and substantive due
process, and class-of-one and selective enforcement equal protection claims.
District court granted employer's motion for summary judgment as to employee's
RA, First Amendment, substantive due process, and equal protection claims.
However, employer's motion for summary judgment was denied as to employee's
Title VII and procedural due process claims.); Paola v. Spada, 498 F. Supp. 2d 502
(D. Conn. 2007) (Employee asserted First Amendment retaliation and class-of-one
equal protection claims. District court granted employer's motion for summary
judgment as to employee's class-of-one claim but denied the motion as to the First
Amendment claim.); Lami v. Stahl, No. 3:05CV1416 (MRK), 2007 WL 2221162
(D. Conn. July 31, 2007) (Employee asserted class-of-one equal protection and
First Amendment retaliation claims. District court granted employer's motion for
summary judgment as to both claims.); Pina v. Lantz, 495 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.
Conn. 2007) (Employee brought substantive and procedural due process, classbased equal protection, class-of-one equal protection, and Title VII discrimination
claims. District court granted employer's motion for summary judgment as to
employee's due process claims but denied the motion as to employee's equal
protection and Title VII claims.); Jackson v. City of Chicago, 521 F. Supp. 2d 745
(N.D. I11.2007) (Employee asserted Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), First
Amendment retaliation, and class-of-one equal protection claims. District court
granted employer's motion to dismiss as to employee's ADA claim but denied the
motion as to employee's First Amendment and class-of-one claims.); Hayden v.
Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 506 F. Supp. 2d 944 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Employee
asserted First Amendment retaliation, due process, and class-of-one equal
protection claims, as well as state law claims. District court granted employer's
motion to dismiss as to employee's due process claims but denied the motion as to
employee's class-of-one claim. District court permitted employee time to amend
complaint with respect to the First Amendment claim); Ferguson v. City of
Rochester Sch. Dist., 485 F. Supp. 2d 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (Employee asserted
class-of-one equal protection and due process claims. District court granted
employer's motion to dismiss as to employee's equal protection claim.); Sharer v.
Oregon, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Or. 2007) (Employee asserted class-of-one
equal protection and Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claims, along with
state law claims. District court held that employee's class-of-one claim was barred
by the Ninth Circuit's holding in Engquist. Employer's motion for summary
judgment was granted as to employee's FMLA claim.); Gaskin v. Vill. of Pachuta,
484 F. Supp. 2d 551 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (Employee asserted due process and classof-one equal protection claims. District court granted employer's motion for
summary judgment as to both claims.); Goldfarb v. Town of West Hartford, 474 F.
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preliminary motions,153 while four survived preliminary
motions. 5 In the case that involved only a class-of-one claim, the
district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 55 Thus, of
the sixteen class-of-one federal cases examined from 2007, five
claims had the potential to proceed to trial. Although the class-ofone claims were dismissed less frequently than in prior years, the

plaintiffs' success rate in 2007 was only thirty-eight percent.
The sample contained thirty-six total class-of-one claims
asserted by public employees in 2008, eight at the appellate level
and twenty-eight at the district court level. An examination of the
2008 federal cases reveals that thirty-one of the thirty-six class-ofone claims were dismissed based on either the Supreme Court's
56
rule in Engquist or the Ninth Circuit's holding in that same case.'

Supp. 2d 356 (D. Conn. 2007) (Employee asserted due process and class-of-one
equal protection claims, as well as state law claims. District court granted
employer's motion for summary judgment as to all claims.).
153. Albert, 529 F. Supp. 2d 311; Milardo, 528 F. Supp. 2d 41; Maglietti, 517
F. Supp. 2d 624; Paola,498 F. Supp. 2d 502; Lami, 2007 WL 2221162; Ferguson,
485 F. Supp. 2d 256; Sharer, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1156; Goldfarb, 474 F. Supp. 2d
356; Gaskin, 484 F. Supp. 2d 551.
154. Meer, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1044; Pina,495 F. Supp. 2d 290; Jackson, 521 F.
Supp. 2d 745; Hayden, 506 F. Supp. 2d 944..
155. Costabile v. County of Westchester, N.Y., 485 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (Employee asserted class-of-one equal protection and state law disability
discrimination claims. District court denied employer's motion to dismiss as to
both claims.).
156. Porr v. Daman, 299 F. App'x 84 (2d Cir. 2008); Lahren v. Univ. & Cmty.
Coll. Sys. of Nev., 293 F. App'x 546 (9th Cir. 2008); Kelley v. City of
Albequerque, 542 F.3d 802 (10th Cir. 2008); Brillinger v. City of Lake Worth, No.
08-10020, 2008 WL 3864383 (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2008); Appel v. Spiridon, 531
F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008); Bowman v. Burroughs, No. 07-185, 2008 WL 5427910
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2008); Vigor v. City of Sarland, No. 07-0733-WS-M, 2008
WL 5225821 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2008); Kaiser v. Highland Cent. Sch. Dist., No.
1:08-CV-0436 (LEKIRFT) 2008 WL 5157450 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2008);
Kamholtz v. Yates County, No. 08-CV-6210, 2008 WL 5114964 (W.D.N.Y. Dec.
3, 2008); Kwentoh v. Conn. Dep't of Children & Families Juvenile Training Sch.,
588 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008); Marino v. Shoreham-Wading River Cent.
Sch. Dist., No. CV-08-0825 (SJF) (WDW), 2008 WL 5068639 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
20, 2008); Wheeler v. McDaniel, No. 1:08-CV-56, 2008 WL 4963106 (E.D. Tenn.
Nov. 18, 2008); Shark v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 2616(PKC), 2008 WL
4444122 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008); Stas v. Lynch, 576 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D. Conn.
2008); Brady v. Dammer, 573 F. Supp. 2d 712 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); Keamey v. City
of Bridgeport Police Dep't, 573 F. Supp. 2d 562 (D. Conn. 2008); Dones v. City
of New York, No. 07 Civ. 3085 (SAS), 2008 WL 2742108 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,
2008); Eaton v. Siemens, No. CIV. S-07-315 FCD KJM, 2008 WL 4347735 (E.D.
Cal. Sept 22, 2008); Wiggins v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., No. 06 Civ.1946(THK),
2008 WL 3447573 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2008); Carone v. Mascolo, 573 F. Supp. 2d
575 (D. Conn. 2008); Buell v. Hughes, 568 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. Conn. 2008);
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As such, whether the class-of-one claims in these cases were
dismissed on preliminary motions does not further the inquiry as to
the accuracy of Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. Still, whether
these cases included other federal claims along with the class-ofone claims calls into question the necessity of the Court's
categorical rule. In the circuit courts of appeals, six of the eight
cases involved multiple federal claims.' 5 In the district courts,
twenty-seven of the twenty-eight cases involved multiple federal
claims. 158 Although the volume of cases returned in the sample for

Stimeling v. Bd. of Educ., No. 07-1330, 2008 WL 2876528 (C.D. Ill. July 24,
2008); lovinelli v. Pritchett, No. 06 C 6404, 2008 WL 2705446 (N.D. Ill. July 9,
2008); Clayton v. City of Middletown, 564 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D. Conn. 2008);
Giglio v. Derman, 560 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Conn. 2008); Babiak v. Nev. ex rel.
Dep't of Taxation, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Nev. 2008); Huff v. City of Portland,
Civ. No. 05-1831-AA, 2008 WL 1902760 (D. Or. April 28, 2008); Robinson v.
Pierce County, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Williams v. City of
Oakland, No. C-06-00303 EDL, 2008 WL 268985 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2008).
157. Porr, 299 F. App'x 84 (Former public school teacher asserted First
Amendment retaliation and class-of-one equal protection claims.); Kelley, 542 F.
3d 802 (Employee brought Title VII and class-of-one equal protection claims.);
Pignanelli v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 540 F. 3d 1213 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2008)
(Former public school teacher asserted First Amendment, class-of-one equal
protection, and due process claims.); Brillinger,2008 WL 3864383 (Former police
officer challenged termination asserting Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
class-of-one equal protection, and First Amendment claims.); Williams v. Riley,
275 F. App'x 385 (10th Cir. 2008) (Employees challenged terminations, asserting
First Amendment retaliation and class-of-one equal protection claims.); Price v.
The City of New York, 264 F. App'x 66 (2d Cir. 2008) (Former police officer
asserted ADA and class-of-one equal protection claims.)
158. Bowman, 2008 WL 5427910 (Former police officer challenged his
discharge, asserting due process and class-of-one equal protection claims.); Vigor,
2008 WL 5225821 (Firefighter asserted First Amendment, procedural and
substantive due process, and class-of-one equal protection claims.); Kaiser, 2008
WL 5157450 (Employee asserted ADA and "class of one" equal protection
claims, as well as state law discrimination claims.); Kamholtz, 2008 WL 5114964
(Employee asserted First Amendment retaliation, class-of-one equal protection,
and malicious prosecution claims, along with state law claims.); Kwentoh, 588 F.
Supp. 2d 292 (Employee asserted Title VII, First Amendment retaliation, and
class-of-one equal protection claims.); Marino, 2008 WL 5068639 (Former
teacher asserted procedural due process and class-of-one equal protection claims.);
Wheeler, 2008 WL 4963106 (Former teacher asserted procedural due process,
class-of-one equal protection, First Amendment retaliation, and Fifth Amendment
claims.); Shark, 2008 WL 4444122 (Former corrections officer asserted FMLA
retaliation, and class-of-one and class-based equal protection claims.); Brady, 573
F. Supp. 2d 712 (Employee brought ADA, First Amendment retaliation, due
process, class-of-one equal protection, and conspiracy claims, along with state law
claims.); Kearney, 573 F. Supp. 2d 562 (Former police officer brought Title VII,
First Amendment, due process, and class-of-one and class-based equal protection
claims.); Dones, 2008 WL 2742108 (Former police officer asserted due process,
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2008 was significantly greater than the other years examined, all
but three of the thirty-six cases involved multiple federal claims.
Engquist's categorical rule did not prevent any of the plaintiffs in
those cases from pursuing their other federal claims.
One of the 2008 cases signals a separate development that
could also undermine the Court's rationale for Engquist's
categorical rule. In Eaton v. Siemens, the district court dismissed
the plaintiff s class-of-one claim but granted him leave to amend in
order to assert a class-based equal protection claim. 59 In the
previous cases examined, several have involved both class-of-one
and class-based equal protection claims.' 60 Thus, class-of-one
class-of-one and selective enforcement equal protection, and conspiracy claims.);
Combs-Hartshorn v. Budz, No. 05 C 2872, 2008 WL 4934048 (N.D. I11. June 12,
2008) (Employee asserted First Amendment, class-of-one, class-based, and
malicious prosecution equal protection, due process, conspiracy, and state law
claims.); Eaton, 2008 WL 4347735 (Employee asserted class-of-one equal
protection and due process claims.); Wiggins, 2008 WL 3447573 (Employee
brought class-of-one and class-based Equal Protection claims, as well as state law
claims.); Carone, 573 F. Supp. 2d 575 (Employee asserted First Amendment
retaliation, class-of-one equal protection, and substantive and procedural due
process claims, as well as state law claims.); Buell, 568 F. Supp. 2d 235
(Employees asserted class-of-one equal protection and procedural due process
claims.); Stimeling, 2008 WL 2876528 (Employee asserted Title VII retaliation,
28 U.S.C. 1981 retaliation, class-of-one equal protection, and procedural due
process claims.); lovinelli, 2008 WL 2705446 (Firefighter asserted First
Amendment retaliation, due process, and class-of-one equal protection claims, as
well as state law claims.); Clayton, 564 F. Supp. 2d 105 (City police officer
asserted First Amendment retaliation, due process, and class-of-one equal
protection claims.); Giglio, 560 F. Supp. 2d 163 (Police officer asserted First
Amendment and class-of-one equal protection claims.); Babiak, 554 F. Supp. 2d
1187 (Employee asserted ADA and class-of-one equal protection claims.);
Baldyga v. City of New Britain, 554 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D. Conn. 2008) (Employee
asserted ADA, class-of-one equal protection, First Amendment, and due process
claims.); Huff, 2008 WL 1902760 (Employee asserted First Amendment and classof-one equal protection claims, as well as state law claims.); Wright v. Vill. of
Franklin Park, No. 05 C 3696, 2008 WL 820560 (N.D. I11.Mar. 25, 2008)
(Employee asserted First Amendment, class-of-one equal protection, conspiracy to
violate constitutional rights, due process, and state law claims.); Robinson, 539 F.
Supp. 2d 1316 (Employee asserted class-of-one equal protection and due process
claims, as well as state law claims.); Williams, 2008 WL 268985 (Employee
asserted First Amendment retaliation, procedural due process, and class-of-one
equal protection claims.); Eiden v. McCarthy, 531 F. Supp. 2d 333 (D. Conn.
2008) (Employee asserted First Amendment retaliation and class-of-one equal
protection claims.).
159. 2008 WL 4347735 at *4.
160. Albert, 529 F. Supp. 2d 311; Pina,495 F. Supp. 2d 290; Lee, 427 F. Supp.
2d 124; Perry, 390 F. Supp. 2d 251; Harvey, 352 F. Supp. 2d 285; Shark, 2008
WL 4444122; Kearney, 573 F. Supp. 2d 562; Combs-Hartshorn, 2008 WL
4934048; Wiggins, 2008 WL 3447573.
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public employees can sometimes also assert class-based
discrimination, which is not foreclosed by Engquist. The Court's
per se rule has the potential to create meritless claims itself by
motivating class-of-one plaintiffs to attempt to fit themselves into
protected classes in order to assert viable claims. Further, if
plaintiffs are permitted to amend their petitions to allege classbased discrimination, then federal courts will have to consider
motions to dismiss in these cases not once, but twice. This might
implicate the flood concern even more so than permitting plaintiffs
to assert the proper claim in the first place.
2. Overall Assessment
(Out of 105 Total Cases Examined)
Year:

2001

Cases

3

Examined__
Multiple

3

8

2

5

Claims
Clas6-oflone
Dismissed

2002
9

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

.6

6

15

14

16

36

5

5

11

12

15

33

5

4

14

11

11'

31~

The cases examined support the assessment of Justice Stevens
much more than they support the Court's flood concern. From
2001 to 2008, 105 cases asserting class-of-one claims were
sampled for analysis. Ninety-two of those cases involved multiple
federal claims. Therefore, the application of Engquist's categorical
rule would not have prevented these plaintiffs from reaching the
courts. Further, fifty-two of the class-of-one claims from 2001 to
2007 were disposed of on preliminary motions. In these cases,
outright denial of the class-of-one claims would have been
unnecessary. In 2008, Engquist'sper se rule required the automatic
dismissal of thirty-one of the thirty-six class-of-one claims
examined. The dismissal rate of these cases does not support or
detract from the Court's rationale. But, with respect to the fifty-two
class-of-one claims that were dismissed on preliminary motions
from 2001 to 2007, the Court's flood concern becomes moot when
the displacement of managerial discretion with judicial supervision
can be avoided through conventional procedural devices. Although
the cases examined do not represent the entirety of class-of-one
jurisprudence in the public employment context, the low volume of
cases in the sample at least supports that claims explicitly labeled
161. These cases were dismissed as a matter of law under Engquist, not on
substantive grounds.
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class-of-one are rare. Ultimately, these numbers illustrate "that
['class-of-one'] claims are brought infrequently, that the vast
majority of such claims are asserted in complaints advancing other
claims as well, and
1 62 that all but a handful are dismissed well in
advance of trial.

V. SUGGESTED CHANGE TO AND IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT LAW

A. Fashioninga Rule with the Surgeon s Tool: RelatingJustice
Breyer's Concurrencein Village of Willowbrook v. Olech to
Justice Stevens 'Dissent in Engquist v. Oregon
In his criticism of Engquist's per se rule, Justice Stevens
likened the categorical denial of class-of-one claims in the public
employment context to a sort of butchery.' 63 He stated:
Today, the Court creates a new substantive rule excepting
state employees from the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection against unequal and irrational treatment at the
hands of the State. Even if some surgery were truly
necessary to prevent governments from being forced to
defend a multitude of equal protection "class of one" claims,
the Court should use a scalpel rather than a meat-axe. 164
Despite this criticism, Justice Stevens did not suggest an
approach to limiting these claims that would allay the Court's
flood concern and simultaneously afford deserving litigants the
class-of-one remedy. Yet, in his concurrence in Olech, Justice
Breyer provided a workable alternative to Engquist's categorical
rule several years before the Court asserted its necessity.165 Justice
Breyer's suggested approach would operate to discourage frivolous
class-of-one claims while preserving valid ones.
In Olech, Justice Breyer was concerned with the potential flood
of litigation that the Court's formal recognition of class-of-one
equal protection might cause. 166 Accordingly, he concurred to
suggest that the Court employ the approach used by the Seventh
Circuit in that same case."57 Justice Breyer believed that requiring
plaintiffs to prove "illegitimate animus" or "ill will" on the part of
162. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2160-61 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.at2158.
165. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565--66 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
166. Id.at 565.
167. Id. at 565-66.
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the state actor, along with arbitrary action, would be "sufficient to
minimize any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill zoning
cases into cases of constitutional right." 68 Of course, it is not
surprising that Justice Breyer voted with the majority in Engquist.
After all, he was the only member of the Olech Court who
expressed any concern regarding the flood of litigation that formal
recognition of the class-of-one theory might generate. 169 It is also
not surprising that he did not write separately in Engquist to
advocate application of the ill-will prong. In Olech, Justice Breyer
advocated this approach to limit class-of-one claims in zoning
cases. 17 In Engquist, advocacy of this requirement in the public
employment context would have undermined the Court's per se
rule. Indeed, if class-of-one claims may be successfully limited,
there is far less justification for their categorical denial. The flood
concern favored denial over limitation. However, it is surprising
that none of the dissenting members of the Engquist Court
suggested adoption of the ill-will requirement. The existence of
this limiting approach makes the necessity of a per se rule
questionable. Further, some federal courts already employ this
heightened pleading in class-of-one cases. 171 Judicial familiarity
with this alternative lends even more support to its adoption.
Of the successful "class-of-one cases" examined in Part IV,
some of the courts that ruled in favor of the plaintiffs did so, in
part, based on the existence of an element of ill-will. A closer look
at these cases illustrates that plaintiffs who can allege ill-will are
deserving of Fourteenth Amendment protection, even though the
discrimination at issue is not class-based.
In Caudell v. City of Toccoa, the plaintiff challenged a state
legislative act that would have prohibited any person from serving
on the city commission and the hospital board simultaneously.
The plaintiff was the "only person in the entire State of Georgia
affected by [the Act].' 73 Thus, the court deemed it "fair to infer
that plaintiff [had] been singled out for a special burden to which
others have not been subjected."' 174 The court also expressed
curiosity that the act only affected the plaintiff's municipality and

168. Id.at 566.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Gehan, supra note 44, at 359-63. (discussing the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals' requirement of a showing of "malice" or "ill-will" in class-ofone cases post-Olech); see also Richter, supra note 52, at 228-31.
172. 153 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374(N.D. Ga. 2001).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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not the other two county municipalities. 175 Only residents in the
plaintiffs town were prevented from serving in both roles, while
those in the other two towns could if they so wished. 176 The court
hinted that it suspected some personal politics were at play in the
passage of the act. 1 77 Thus, in this class-of-one claim that survived
a motion for summary judgment, the court at least suspected there
was an element of ill-will or personal animosity in the challenged
act. Such an arbitrary enactment, especially in light of its singular
effect on one county municipality, should not survive
constitutional scrutiny. Yet if the plaintiff in Caudell had been
unable to assert a class-of-one claim, this discriminatory legislative
act would have escaped the scope of the Equal Protection Clause.
In Bower v. Village of Mount Sterling, the plaintiff challenged
the local police force's decision not to hire him. 178 The court
explained that "[t]he factual allegations could be reasonably
construed as the Mayor employing the Villages' hiring process to
'get' Plaintiff due to Plaintiffs association with his parents who
are political opponents of [the Mayor]."' 179 One should not be
denied a job based on his or her parents' political associations.
Essentially, this plaintiff, in a "class of one," was denied
employment because of his unique family ties. Such personal
animosity has no place in public employment, especially when it
affects individuals indirectly, based on factors over which they
have no control. If the class-of-one theory had been unavailable to
the plaintiff in Bower, then the arbitrary and vindictive action
taken against him would have been outside the reach of the Equal
Protection Clause.
In Carr v. Village of Willow Springs, a police officer alleged
that he was singled out for unwarranted discipline because of the
chief of police's personal animosity toward him. 180 He asserted
that his superior perceived him as a formidable opponent for the
chief of police position.' 8 1 A state official should not be able to
prevent an employee's advancement based on such illegitimate
animus and still escape the Equal Protection Clause's purview.
However, because the action taken against him was not based on
his membership in any protected class, the plaintiff in Carr would
have been unable to claim the Equal Protection Clause's guarantee
without the class-of-one theory.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 1376.
44 F. App'x 670, 672 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id at 678.
No. 01 C 7807, 2002 WL 1559665, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
Id.
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If Engquist's categorical rule had been applied in Caudell,
Bower, and Carr, these employees would have been deprived of
the remedies provided by the class-of-one theory. Then, the
arbitrary and vindictive actions taken against the employees might
have escaped constitutional scrutiny. The per se denial of class-ofone equal protection claims to public employees should be
abandoned in favor of a rule that limits the availability of the classof-one theory in the public employment context. By heightening
class-of-one pleading requirements, these cases will be limited but
not totally denied. This alternative addresses the Court's flood
concern, yet it still preserves meritorious claims. When a person
suffers an injury, the law should provide a remedy.' 82 A limiting
approach better serves both employees and their government
employers. Workplace morale and efficiency could be negatively
affected by employee lawsuits just as much as they might be by
unfair adverse employment actions that go unnoticed and
unpunished.
The Court acted too quickly on its concerns regarding the
effect of the class-of-one theory in the public employment context
before evaluating whether its categorical denial was necessary. The
appropriate initial approach is not to bar class-of-one public
employees from the courts, but to limit their claims in such a way
as to prevent meritless ones and permit viable ones. Application of
the ill-will requirement to these claims could achieve this effect.
However, by failing to even consider an alternative, the Court has
prevented any evaluation of such a method. A prudent doctor
would never decide to amputate before considering surgery to save
a patient's limb, but this is precisely what the Engquist Court did
by severing class-of-one claims from public employees' body of
constitutional rights.
B. Another Right in Dangerof Denial in the PublicEmployment
Context: Due Process
Judge Posner characterized Ciechon v. City of Chicago as "the
extreme case that kicked off the 'class of one' movement.' l8 3 But,
Ms. Ciechon did not base her case solely on the Equal Protection
Clause. She also sought redress under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' 84 If it is the intention of the Supreme
Court to remove the federal judiciary from discretionary public
employment matters and to avoid the flood of litigation that this
182. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 130 (2007).
183. Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005).
184. Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1982).
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judicial involvement might cause, then public employees' rights
under the Due Process Clause may be in jeopardy of denial as well.
Today, although the class-of-one theory would be unavailable to
her, Ms. Ciechon could at least invoke the protection of due
process. Unfortunately, based on the cases analyzed herein, 185 the
Court's flood concern could lead to the denial of public
employees' due process claims.
Of the 108 cases examined, fifty-two involved alleged
violations of due process. 186 This is evidence of the relative
185. See infra Part V.
186. Pignanelli v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 540 F. 3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2008);
Bowman v. Burroughs, No. 07-185, 2008 WL 5427910 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2008);
Vigor v. City of Sarland, No. 07-0733-WS-M, 2008 WL 5225821 (S.D. Ala. Dec.
11, 2008); Marino v. Shoreham-Wading River Cent. Sch. Dist., No. CV-08-0825
(SJF) (WDW), 2008 WL 5068639 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2008); Wheeler v.
McDaniel, No. 1:08-CV-56, 2008 WL 4963106 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2008);
Brady v. Dammer, 573 F. Supp. 2d 712 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); Keamey v. City of
Bridgeport Police Dep't, 573 F. Supp. 2d 562 (D. Conn. 2008); Combs-Hartshorn
v. Budz, No. 05 C 2872, 2008 WL 4934048 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2008); Eaton v.
Siemens, No. CIV. S-07-315 FCD KJM, 2008 WL 4347735 (E.D. Cal. Sept 22,
2008); Carone v. Mascolo, 573 F. Supp. 2d 575 (D. Conn. 2008); Buell v. Hughes,
568 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. Conn. 2008); Stimeling v. Bd. of Educ., No. 07-1330,
2008 WL 2876528 (C.D. I11.July 24, 2008); lovinelli v. Pritchett, No. 06 C 6404,
2008 WL 2705446 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2008); Clayton v. City of Middletown, 564 F.
Supp. 2d 105 (D. Conn. 2008); Tacinelli v. Town of Plainville, Civ. No.
06CV1758 (WWE), 2008 WL 2477611 (D. Conn. June 16, 2008); Baldyga v. City
of New Britain, 554 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D. Conn. 2008); Wright v. Vill. of Franklin
Park, No. 05 C 3696, 2008 WL 820560 (N.D. Ill. March 25, 2008); Robinson v.
Pierce County, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Williams v. City of
Oakland, No. C-06-00303 EDL, 2008 WL 268985 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2008);
Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007); Gaskin v. Vill. of
Pachuta, 484 F. Supp. 2d 551 (S.D. Miss. 2007); Goldfarb v. Town of West
Hartford, 474 F. Supp. 2d 356 (D. Conn. 2007); Ferguson v. City of Rochester
Sch. Dist., 485 F. Supp. 2d 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); Pina v. Lantz, 495 F. Supp. 2d
290 (D. Conn. 2007); Hayden v. Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 506 F. Supp. 2d 944
(M.D. Ala. 2007); Maglietti v. Nicholson, 517 F. Supp. 2d 624 (D. Conn. 2007);
Meer v. Graham, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Nance v. New Orleans &
Baton Rouge Steamship Pilots' Ass'n, 174 Fed. App'x 849 (5th Cir. 2006);
Golden v. Town of Collierville, 167 F. App'x 474 (6th Cir. 2006); Matsey v.
Westmoreland County, 185 F. App'x 126 (3d Cir. 2006); Baynton v. Wyatt, 411
F. Supp. 2d 1223 (D. Or. 2006); Barry v. Luzerne County, 447 F. Supp. 2d 238
(M.D. Pa. 2006); Axt v. City of Fort Wayne, No. l:06-CV-157-TS, 2006 WL
3093235 (N.D. Ind. 2006); Levine v. McCabe, 357 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); Hinton v. Conner, 366 F. Supp. 2d 297 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Inturri v. City of
Hartford, Conn., 365 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D. Conn. 2005); Williams v. LaCrosse, No.
Civ.A. 03-6724, 2005 WL 927112 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Hicks v. Jackson County
Comm'n, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Ala. 2005); Perry v. Metro. Suburban Bus
Auth., 390 F. Supp. 2d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Rivera v. City of N.Y., 392 F. Supp.
2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Benjamin v. Schuller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (S.D. Ohio
2005); Carpenter v. City of Torrington, 100 F. App'x 858 (2d Cir. 2004);
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frequency with which public employees bring these claims.
Garcetti and Engquist set a dangerous precedent. Courts could
easily justify the categorical denial of constitutional claims based
on the fact that others are already barred in the public employment
187
context. If unsubstantiated fear and "inapt hypothetical cases"
can serve as the foundation for such per se rules, then it is at least a
possibility that the same result could follow for public employees'
rights under the Due Process Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION: ADDRESSING JUDICIAL CONCERN AND

PRESERVING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

The shift to categorical treatment of certain constitutional
claims in the public employment context is a significant change in
the law. However, Engquist's per se rule lacks support in the
rationales upon which it is based. Far from resulting in a flood of
litigation, the class-of-one theory has led to relatively few cases in
federal courts, most of which assert other claims and are dismissed
on preliminary motions. This reality makes the necessity of a
categorical rule to deny these claims questionable. Absent a
substantial volume of cases, the concern regarding the
displacement of managerial discretion with judicial supervision is
diminished because such intervention would seldom occur. Also,
the Court's reticence to permit judicial intervention into
employment disputes may deprive public employees of the only
remedies available to challenge adverse employment actions. If a
government employee is treated arbitrarily for vindictive reasons,
that person should be afforded a remedy. In some cases, the Equal
Protection Clause may provide the only remedy. Finally, the
Court's concern regarding the effect that class-of-one claims in the
public employment context would have on the doctrine of at-will
employment is misplaced. Employment-at-will in the private
sector, where it is most prevalent, would be unaffected by the
constitutional claims of public employees.

Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n of City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 02
Civ. 3976(BSJ) (FM), 2004 WL 3262798 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Levesque v. Town of
Vernon, 341 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Conn. 2004); Doubet v. Eckelberg, 81 F. App'x
596 (7th Cir. 2003); Bower v. Viii. of Mount Sterling, 44 F. App'x 670 (6th Cir.
2002); Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2002); Russo
v. City of Hartford, 184 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Conn, 2002); Bartell v. Aurora Pub.
Sch., 263 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2001); Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d
740 (2d Cir. 2001).

187. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2159 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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The Court's reliance on private employment law in the public
employment context has blurred the lines that separate these
institutions. Both the retrenchment of constitutional protections
and the Court's misplaced reliance on employment-at-will has
eroded the traditional distinctions between private and public
employment. Perhaps this is an unstated but intended result of
Engquist and Garcetti. The two opinions benefit government
employers by affording them greater discretion in employment
matters and preventing judicial intervention into these affairs. The
Court's recent change in composition has resulted in a more
conservative-leaning ideology. Engquist and Garcetti are a
manifestation of this shift in legal philosophical posture.
A far more reasoned and principled approach would be to limit
class-of-one claims, not to completely deny them. Requiring classof-one plaintiffs in the public employment context to allege an
element of ill-will could appease both contingents. It would afford
deserving plaintiffs a cause of action while allaying the Supreme
Court's fear of a flood of litigation. Instead of making the rash
decision to cut off class-of-one equal protection from the corpus of
constitutional rights afforded to public employees, the Court
should have first performed a more calculated surgery. If such an
approach were to fail, the Court could always hack away with its
meat-axe later.
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